France in the EU: between institutional juniorization and economic southernization?
At the dawn of the 2024-2029 European political cycle, France appears weakened in terms of its ability to shape the major orientations of the European Union (EU), i.e. in terms of its “national influence” in Brussels, Strasbourg and beyond (1).
Such a weakening is, of course, only relative: France remains one of the EU’s major economic, diplomatic, military and demographic powers, and as such has considerable decision-making clout; the changing geopolitical context still seems conducive to promoting traditional French ideas of international activism, economic interventionism and industrial voluntarism; and – more intangibly – many Europeans love our dear old country and will continue to listen to it, even in difficult times.
But the evolution of a country’s influence at European level depends precisely on its ability to promote its interests, taking advantage of its assets, a more or less favorable context and the mixed feelings it inspires, to convince its partners to follow it. In this respect, it is distressing to observe a clear step backwards compared to the situation that prevailed 5 years ago in terms of political balances of power, as crystallized notably within the EU’s three main institutions.
First and foremost, the European elections of June 6-9, 2024 delivered a most negative verdict, since a country’s influence in the European Parliament depends on its ability to elect as many MEPs as possible to the groups negotiating and forging majority coalitions – namely the conservatives of the European People’s Party, the Social Democrats, the Liberals of “Renew” and, to a lesser extent, the Greens and the “Conservatives and Reformists”. The increase in the number of MEPs for the RN (from 23 to 31) and France Insoumise (now with 9) is therefore particularly counter-productive in this respect, as they concentrate half the national contingent in peripheral, tribunitian groups. The same applies to the weakening leadership of Macronist elected representatives, down from 23 to 13 within a Liberal group itself in sharp decline (now5th in quantitative terms), even though it will strive to retain a pivotal role. With the French presence in the dominant EPP group reduced to a minimum (6 MEP’s), the only positive development in terms of national influence is the doubling of the number of French members of the S&D Group, combined with the reduction in the number of members of the German SPD.
Comfortably re-elected to the Presidency of the European Commission, Ursula von der Leyen offered a supposedly larger portfolio to France on condition that Thierry Breton did not inherit it, which led to his resignation. The very fact that she dared to engage in such a tug-of-war says as much about her disagreement with a hyperactive Commissioner as it does about her declining respect for “Paris”, which was also weak enough to give in… The new Commissioner proposed by France will in fact have hierarchical authority only over the “Grow” Directorate-General, dedicated to the internal market and enterprises, whereas his predecessor could also mobilize those dedicated to the digital economy (“DG Cnect”) and defense and space (“DG Défis”). Stéphane Séjourné’s promotion to Executive Vice-President in charge of “prosperity and industrial strategy” appears to be all the more illusory a compensation, given that six of these positions now exist, compared with three up to now, within a College even more dominated by its President and members of her party. Stéphane Séjourné’s lack of expertise and experience on economic issues is likely to amplify his difficulties in exerting any effective influence on well-established Commissioners whom he is merely deemed to “coordinate”, such as Maroš Šefčovič for trade and Valdis Dombrovskis for the economy – a profile as senior as Thierry Breton’s would have had a little more credibility in this perspective…
The evolution of French influence in the bodies bringing together the representatives of the 27 member states is hardly more encouraging. Until now, Emmanuel Macron has had a strong voice in the European Council, but has already been weakened by the retreat of his political family. He initiated a misunderstood dissolution of the French National Assembly, the verdict of which, in the form of an unprecedented hara-kiri, has damaged both his personal image and the governability of our country. The high turnover of the new government members and their hypothetical longevity will affect their ability to forge solid and lasting diplomatic and partisan alliances – the appointment of a 7th European Affairs Minister in 7 years representing a sad symbolic record in this respect… The accession of Michel Barnier to the post of Prime Minister is certainly a more positive signal, since he is well known and respected at European level – but he is only called upon to play a subsidiary role in EU bodies…
It is to be feared that the institutional “juniorization” of French influence will be aggravated by a form of economic “southernization”: France’s heavy budgetary, commercial and industrial deficits are indeed an increasingly serious triple handicap in an EU where most countries keep their books in order, have trade surpluses and have not undergone massive deindustrialization. How can we convince Europeans to launch new joint loans and investments to better face up to Chinese and American competition when we’ve been unable to keep our European budgetary commitments for ages? How can we exercise our international leadership by planning to form a blocking minority against the EU-Mercosur agreement, when the vast majority of EU countries welcome it for both economic and geopolitical reasons? How can we persuade our neighbors to launch new “industrial alliance” projects if the largely domestic origins of France’s productive devitalization are not properly identified and addressed by authorities with a strong legitimacy to do so?
The French authorities can always console themselves with the fact that Germany is currently facing a different kind of economic downturn and the end of its political reign – even if the expected victory of the CDU-CSU next year will appear to be a positive outcome when compared with a French slump with no clear way out. They may also note that Georgia Meloni’s Italy, though strengthened by the European elections, risks continuing to suffer from its partisan positioning and financial fragility. But they will find it more difficult to come to terms with the consequences of the growing institutional and political power of the countries of Central, Northern and Eastern Europe, already amplified by their clear-sightedness regarding the Russian threat and their frontline support for the Ukrainian people.
It remains to be seen how the outcome of the Russian invasion, the verdict of the American presidential election and the growing aggressiveness of China will affect the buoyant winds that French players have been able to capitalize on in recent times, including during the French presidency of the Council in 2022. One thing seems certain at the dawn of the 2024-2029 political cycle: it will be better to understand German and/or be close to the European People’s Party in order to be more influential at European level, even though French ideas will continue to be widely disseminated and examined – if not approved…
(1) This blog post reprints a contribution to the Grande Conversation (Terra Nova) published in October 2024