Macron and the Balkans: a “no” which means “maybe”?

Emmanuel Macron’s refusal to open accession negotiations with Albania and Northern Macedonia at the end of 2019 was unexpected, as seen from the rest of Europe, but quite predictable, as seen from France. It stems partly from peripheral political considerations of which the Western Balkan countries are expiatory victims, but also from more structural problems that need to be addressed in the run-up to the Zagreb Summit in May 2020.

On the “good news” side, it should be stressed that the countries of the Western Balkans are the collateral victims of domestic and European problems that go beyond them, and which could therefore be solved outside them and in the short term.

Problem n°1: Emmanuel Macron’s lack of popularity after the “yellow vest” crisis and at the time of a bold pension reform.

This weakness forced him to abandon the “spirit of conquest” praised during his electoral campaign and to align himself with all those who preferred a “smaller Europe” that was more under French control. Any positive move from France on enlargement is to be politically costly, including for its new President.

Emmanuel Macron, vintage 2017, would have justified the opening of new accession negotiations on the theme: “France is not going to be afraid to open discussions with very small countries, which will only join us in 10 years’ time…” – but these times are gone… If President Macron’s popularity increases again, that may make it easier for him to endorse the prospect of such a long term accession, all the more that he will be able to recall that it is not automatic (as the case of Turkey demonstrates).

Problem n°2: Emmanuel Macron’s influence deficit at the European level, both from the point of view of his political and partisan forces and allies and in view of the very ambitious nature of his objectives for the “re-foundation” of the EU.

It is also this relative lack of influence that has recently prompted Emmanuel Macron to seek levers of action in order to obtain « package deals » more favorable to the realization of his projects. Thus, President Macron clearly indicated that his agreement for the opening of accession negotiations was conditional on the adoption of a more ambitious “2021-2027 multiannual financial framework” on the one hand, and on the implementation of a “Conference” to reform and deepen the EU before enlarging it on the other hand.

If he is satisfied with these two aspects in the first semester of 2020, it cannot be ruled out that he may lift his veto on the opening of accession negotiations with Albania and Northern Macedonia. Emmanuel Macron could be all the more tempted to give up his “no” that he knows his European partners could also make him pay for his quite free rider objection, including by strengthening their positions on many other issues dear to France.

However, it will then be necessary to remove the French (but also Danish, Dutch, etc.) reluctance to deal with the issues at stake in the accession negotiations stricto sensu.

Right after Macron’s no, a Franco-Dutch working document aimed at reforming the whole EU accession process has been submitted for discussion at Community level, proposing a less legal (by chapter) and more political approach, but also a better support for the efforts of the EU’s neighbouring countries, whether or not they are about to become members. Now that the European Commission has promoted a “Revised enlargement methodology » early February, Emmanuel Macron will be able to claim that these objections have been heard, in whole or in part, so that he can agree to change his mind next spring.

In this perspective, it remains essential for the national authorities of the candidate countries to give even more guarantees of their ability to radically reform their countries in terms of respect for the rule of law, the preservation of democratic pluralism, the fight against corruption, the repression of organized crime and trafficking of all kinds… The European Commission has already stated that the progress made on these registers was substantial enough to justify the opening of accession negotiations in the two most obvious cases Albania and North Macedonia. Any further progress that can be achieved in the next few months will only benefit the candidate countries’ cause in France and well beyond.

Emmanuel Macron could argue more easily for opening up to the Western Balkans by invoking the threat of Russian, Chinese, Turkish and even American influences in the region, and thus by highlighting the geopolitical dimension of Albania’s and Northern Macedonia’s accession prospects. But he cannot completely disregard these prospects for accession from their national and Community, and therefore political, dimensions. It is also on this register that a more favorable outcome will necessarily have to be achieved in the coming months, thanks to the ongoing efforts of the Croatian Presidency of the Council – hence contributing to transform Emmanuel Macron Fall “may be” into a Spring “yes”.

NB This blog post is the reproduction of an Op. Ed published by in Serbia by Danas, in Macedonia by Nova TV and in Montenegro by Antena M,